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Imprisonment and Recidivism Inquiry 
Queensland Productivity Commission 
PO Box 12112 
George St QLD 4003 
 
Dear Commissioner Wood 
 
Re: Queensland Productivity Commission Inquiry into imprisonment and recidivism 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to this important Inquiry. 
 
For a number of years – together, individually and with others – we have been actively involved in 
research about criminalisation and criminal law-making. Our primary aim has been to support sound 
policy decisions about where, how and why the criminal law is deployed as a public policy mechanism. 
We are pleased and encouraged that the Queensland Productivity Commission (‘the Commission’) is 
investigating these questions, with a view to narrowing the parameters of the criminal law. 
 
In this submission we have not attempted to address all of the topics, draft recommendations and 
information requests contained in the Draft Report. Rather, we have addressed those matters on which 
we have completed relevant research and authored or co-authored publications. These are cited 




Reduce the Scope of Criminal Offences: Draft Recommendation 1 
 
In a context where criminal law reform is often focused on expanding the reach and intensity of 
criminalisation (ie increasing the size of the statute book),1 it is refreshing and encouraging that the 
Commission is considering ways to reduce the number of criminal offences in Queensland. We hope 
that more Australian jurisdictions will follow this lead.  
 
We agree that the Queensland Government should seek to remove activities from the Criminal Code 
Act 1899 and other relevant legislation. Our research suggests that there are especially good reasons 
for doing so in relation to public order offences, and we return to this matter below, in our response to 
Recommendation 2.  
 
In terms of reconsidering the parameters of criminalisation we would advocate an approach which 
does not only focus exclusively on criminal offences, but instead also considers other legislative 
arrangements by which the parameters of the criminal justice system are shaped. For example, the 
																																																						
1 L McNamara, J Quilter, R Hogg, H Douglas, A Loughnan and D Brown, ‘Theorising criminalisation: 
The Value of a Modalities Approach’ (2018) 7(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 91-121 DOI: 10.5204/ijcjsd.v7i3.511; L McNamara & J Quilter, ‘The “Bikie Effect” and 
other Forms of Demonisation: the Origins and Effects of Hyper-criminalisation’ (2016) 34(2) Law in 
Context 5-35. 
	 2 
scope of police powers and how they are exercised can contribute to ‘over-criminalisation’.2 An 
example is the ‘move-on’ power (in Queensland: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), 
Part 5). The legislation that underpins such police powers are often under-appreciated as a potential 
source of over-criminalisation, because the threat of criminalisation (and punishment) is 
‘backgrounded’. Being issued with a direction does not involve an allegation of the commission of a 
criminal offence, and if the regime works ‘optimally’ no criminal charges or sanctions result – the 
target of the direction leaves the location where their presence has been deemed by the police to be 
objectionable. However, non-compliance with a move-on direction is an offence. Legislation that 
establishes ‘two-step’ criminalisation in this way should be included in any review of existing criminal 
laws. 
 
The challenge in reducing the scope of criminal offences will be to determine the guiding principles 
for this exercise. Draft Recommendation 1 contains a useful starting point for the development of a set 
of criteria for considering if an activity should be removed from the Criminal Code or other relevant 
legislation. There is a body of theoretical literature by criminal law scholars which attempts to define 
the legitimate parameters of the criminal law.3 However, abstract frameworks are insufficient to guide 
decisions about when/how the criminal law should be used.4 
 
If the Commission is minded to endorse guiding principles of the sort expressed in the Draft Report, 
it will be important to ensure they are not expressed at such a high level of generality that it is difficult 
to distinguish one offence from another as to whether there is a case for continued criminalisation of 
the behaviour in question. The harm principle is an excellent starting point, but its deployment will 
first require a careful articulation of the concept of ‘harm’. A significant number of existing offences 
would not be justified on a classic liberal formulation of the harm (to others) principle, including public 
order and illicit drug use offences. Our point is not that the Commission should retreat from 
recommending a harm-based rationalisation of Queensland criminal offences, but that this laudable 
course may first require debate and consultation on different conceptions of harm – including 
economic and social harms. In addition, it will be necessary to confront the fact that a number of 
existing offences turn on a risk of harm paradigm, rather than realised harm (eg Summary Offences Act 
2005 (Qld) (eg s 14 ‘unregulated high-risk activities’; s 15 ‘possession of implement’). Risk of harm 
is a vague, capacious and contested concept,5 and deserves close interrogation before it is accepted as 
a justification for the imposition of criminal penalties. 
 
When it comes to assessing proportionality, and weighing harm against the ‘cost’ of criminalisation 
(approaches which we endorse in principle) there are some important threshold ‘unit of analysis’ 
questions. Should the assessment focus on a single instance of, for example, public urination or 
cannabis use? Or should it consider the multiple instances that occur in a given time period, and/the 
cumulative effects and costs over time? In terms of proportionality, what is the relevant sanction that 
																																																						
2 L McNamara, ‘Criminalisation Research in Australia: Building a foundation for normative theorising 
and principled law reform’ in in T Crofts & A Loughnan (eds), Criminalisation and Criminal 
Responsibility in Australia (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp 33-51. 
3 We note in particular, the large volume of work produced by Antony Duff and colleagues in the UK: 
see, eg, RA Duff et al (eds), Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2014); RA Duff, ‘Towards a Modest Legal Moralism’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 217; V Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford University Press, 2017); RA Duff, The Realm 
of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2018).   
4 D Brown, ‘Criminalisation and Normative Theory’ (2013) 25(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 
605-625. 
5 P O’Malley, Crime and Risk (Sage, 2010). 
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needs to be factored into the equation: the maximum penalty provided for by legislation or the penalty 
that is typically imposed in practice? There is a strong argument that the cumulative effect of multiple 
penalties imposed on an individual should also be considered in a proportionality plus cost-benefit 
analysis, particular where the offence in question is known to impact repeatedly on marginalised 
persons (eg the effect of begging, move-on direction non-compliance and fare evasion offences on 
people experiencing homelessness). 
 
 
Reduce the Scope of Criminal Offences: Draft Recommendation 2 
 
We are supportive of an approach which treats criminalisation as a ‘last resort’ amongst other available 
public policy options. Therefore, in general terms, we support the development of alternative policy 
approaches. However, we caution against assuming that civil remedies and non-criminal sanctions are 
non-punitive or separate from the criminal law. The boundary between criminalisation and other 
modes of regulation is porous. This is especially the case in relation to hybrid civil-criminal forms of 
regulation, such as a Domestic Violence Orders, which ‘draw individuals into the orbit of criminal 
justice intervention, but a criminal offence is only charged by way of a two-step procedure if and when 
the order is violated’. 6 Move-on directions, mentioned above, work in a similar fashion. 
 
Furthermore, the administrative imposition of fines. even if characterised as civil penalties or non-
criminal sanctions, can have significant punitive effects which may be indistinguishable from the 
effects of court imposed fines for criminal offences. The imposition of multiple financial penalties on 




Reduce the Scope of Criminal Offences: Information request:  
 
What current offences do not warrant being defined as an offence? 
 
We focus here on public order offences – an area of the criminal law on which we have conducted 
research and which represents a relatively invisible site of criminalisation. 
 
We submit that there is strong case for decriminalising a number of the offences in the Summary 
Offences Act 2005 (Qld), most notably, begging (s 8) and public intoxication (s 10) – which have been 
decriminalised in most Australian jurisdictions. It is also doubtful that public urination would survive 
a harm/proportionality/cost analysis of the sort proposed by the Commission (discussed above). 
 
Other offences in the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) require redefinition to narrow their scope – 
whether in terms of the breadth of behaviours they cover and/or the penalties they attract. Our general 
view is that public nuisance offences should not lead to a prison sentence; however, we are conscious 
that this position might be challenged, given that the current definition of public nuisance includes a 
variety of behaviours – some of which appear to be more serious than others. 
 
In our view, some forms of public nuisance do not meet the bar for any form of criminalisation – eg 
disorderly behaviour (s 6(2)(a)(i)); and offensive behaviour (s 6(2)(a)(ii)). By contrast, behaviour that 
																																																						
6 See McNamara et al, above n 1, 95. 
7 J Quilter and R Hogg, ‘The hidden punitiveness of fines’ (2018) 7(3) International Journal for Crime, 
Justice and Social Democracy 9-40. DOI: 10.5204/ijcjsd.v7i3.512 
	 4 
is threatening (s 6(2)(a)(iii)) or violent (s 6(2)(a)(iv)) may be regarded as sufficiently harmful to 
warrant some form of criminalisation, but the available sanction should not include imprisonment. 
Threatening or intimidating behaviour which is regarded as sufficiently serious to attract the possibility 
of imprisonment is likely to be covered by Criminal Code offences, such as assault (s 245), stalking (s 
359B) or threatening violence (s 75). 
 
It will be important to collect data on the operation of all Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) in order 
to undertake a sound harm/proportionality/cost assessment. On their face, offences like trespass (s 11) 
and ‘persons unlawfully gathering in or on a building or structure’ (s 12), might be regarded as 
necessary inclusions in the statute books. However, our on-going national research on the 
criminalisation of homelessness suggests that people experiencing homelessness are 
disproportionately represented amongst those charged with trespass and related offences. Further 
evidence about the operation of such offences would be required in order to determine whether the 
current offence should be redefined in some way, and/or whether the maximum penalties should be 
reduced. 
 
The Draft Report asks, ‘Does criminalisation impede a health–based response to the problem of illicit 
drug usage?’ Our submission does not address criminal offences concerned with illicit drug use 
because, apart from a study of Australian drug driving laws,8 we have not conducted relevant research. 
However, we suggest that the question posed – about the relative merits of criminalisation and health-
based responses – might equally be asked in relation to some non-drug offences. An offence like wilful 
exposure (Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 9) may not be the most obvious example of an existing 
offence that warrants decriminalisation. However, if we think about health-based responses broadly, 
and depending on the facts, it may be that the best response to an act of wilful exposure may be a 
mental health-based response. This example underscores an important point: criminalisation and 
decriminalisation are not simply about what is or is not on the statute books, but how the law is 
enforced and what sorts of responses are preferred by decision-makers.  
 
 
Increase the range of non-custodial sanctions: Recommendation 4 
 
We endorse the Commission’s suggestion that non-custodial sentencing options should be more widely 
available. We offer one note of caution about removing restrictions on monetary penalties. While fines 
are often perceived to be at the more benign end of the sentencing spectrum, as mentioned above, fines 
can be more punitive than they appear. They have cumulative effects including potential loss of 
driver’s licences and adding to household debt burdens. Attempts to ameliorate the harshness of such 
financial penalties (time to pay orders) may see a person indebted for decades to come. In this way 
fines may exacerbate the socio-economic disadvantage that is associated with some criminal 
offending; that is, fines can be ‘criminogenic’.9 In a context where the Commission is concerned with 
reducing both imprisonment and recidivism, care should be taken to avoid endorsing reform pathways 






8 J Quilter and L McNamara, ‘“Zero Tolerance” Drug Driving Laws in Australia: A Gap Between 
Rationale and Form?’ (2017) 6(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 47-
71 DOI: 10.5204/ijcjsd.v6i3.416. 
9 Quilter and Hogg, above n 7, 22-23. 
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Reduce the use of remand: Recommendation 6  
 
In our research on the criminalisation of homelessness we have heard from a number of Magistrates 
that appropriate accommodation for bail purposes is a major barrier to a person being granted bail. 
We, therefore, strongly endorse the expansion of bail hostels and other forms of appropriate 
accommodation for homeless persons who are charged with criminal offences.  
 
 
Reduce the use of remand: Recommendation 8  
 
We strongly endorse the recommended insertion of ‘guiding principles into the Bail Act 1980’. In our 
view, it is important that these principles should have the force of law. To this end they should feature 
in an objects or purposes section of the Act – rather than being in a Preamble. In its current form the 
Bail Act 2013 (NSW) takes the latter option:  
 
Preamble 
The Parliament of New South Wales, in enacting this Act, has regard to the following: 
(a)  the need to ensure the safety of victims of crime, individuals and the community, 
(b)  the need to ensure the integrity of the justice system, 
(c)  the common law presumption of innocence and the general right to be at liberty. 
 
 
The important ‘guiding principles’ which the Commission has proposed should not be consigned to a 
largely symbolic Preamble. We regard this aspect of the current Bail Act 2013 (NSW) as a weakness. 
Ironically, a better model for Queensland to follow is the original Bail Act 2013 (NSW), before it was 
hastily amended in 2014. In its original form, the 2013 Act incorporated the presumption of innocence 
and the general right to be at liberty in a section devoted to the ‘Purposes of Act’ (s 3(2)). The decision 
to move these principles to a Preamble was a regrettable knee-jerk response to concerns that the new 
Bail Act 2013 (NSW) was ‘weak on crime’.10 
 
 
Expand Diversionary Options: Draft Recommendation 16 
 
We applaud those parts of this draft recommendation which are directed at better use of police 
discretion. Our work on public order offences shows that the manner in which police officers exercise 
discretion is critical to whether or not a person’s behaviour is characterised as criminal, especially in 
relation to provisions that turn on vague terms like ‘offensive’11  (such as the offence of public nuisance 
in s 6 of the Summary Offences Act 2005 Qld)), and/or which require police to make an observation-
																																																						
10 D Brown and J Quilter, Speaking too soon: The sabotage of bail reform in New South Wales’ (2014) 
3(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 73-97 DOI: 
10.5204/ijcjsd.v3i2.181  
11 J Quilter & L McNamara, ‘Time to Define “the Cornerstone of Public Order Legislation”: The 
Elements of Offensive Conduct and Language under the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW)’ (2013) 
36(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 534-562; L McNamara and J Quilter, ‘Turning the 
Spotlight on ‘Offensiveness’ as a Basis for Criminal Liability’ (2014) 39(1) Alternative Law Journal 
36. 
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based assessment of whether a person is ‘intoxicated’12 – as in the case of public intoxication under s 
10 of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). 
 
KPIs to encourage the efficient use of police discretion, diversion and cautions represent an innovation 
that has considerable potential for reducing over-criminalisation.  
 
In general terms we support additional diversionary options for police; however, the greater 
availability of on-the-spot fines needs to be approached with caution. Evidence shows that the 
availability of penalty notice/on-the-spot fines for low level offending can operate to net-widen, rather 
than reduce the total number of persons coming into contact with the criminal justice system.13  
 
An additional problem with on-the-spot fines is that they compound the problem of inadequate 
oversight and scrutiny of the decision of police officers to enforce public order laws or use their police 
powers. As we have previously noted 
 
… thee contexts in which these laws are operationalised (including, literally, ‘on the street’) 
is such that it is rare for courts (or any non-police agency) to be given the opportunity to 
scrutinise how these laws are being used (including how intoxication is being assessed). As 
with most public order offences, intoxication-related charges attract high rates of guilty pleas, 
and the problem of ‘invisibility’ is exacerbated by the growing use of ‘on-the-spot’ fines or 
‘tickets’, laws that provide for move-on without charges, or detention that is allegedly non-
punitive (see North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory 
[2015] HCA 41). It is noteworthy that the growth of on-the-spot fines for public order and 




12 One of the findings of a national study of Australian criminal laws that attached significance to 
‘intoxication’ is that in the majority of instances of laws governing offences and powers, police (and 
other decision-makers) are given inadequate guidance on what intoxication means or how to assess it. 
See generally: J Quilter, L McNamara, K Seear & R Room, ‘Criminal Law and the Effects of Alcohol 
and Other Drugs: A National Study of the Significance of ‘Intoxication’ Under Australian Legislation’ 
(2016) 39(3) UNSWLJ 913-949; J Quilter, L McNamara, K Seear & R Room, ‘The Definition and 
Significance of “Intoxication” in Australian Criminal Law: A Case Study of Queensland’s “Safe Night 
Out” Legislation’ (2016) 16(2) QUT Law Review 42-58; J Quilter, L McNamara, K Seear and R Room, 
‘The significance of “intoxication” in Australian criminal law’, Australian Institute of Criminology 
Trends and Issues Paper No 546 (May 2018); L McNamara and J Quilter, ‘Public Intoxication in NSW: 
The Contours of Criminalisation’ (2015) 37(1) Sydney Law Review 1-35. 
13 NSW Law Reform Commission, Penalty Notices, Report No 132 (NSWLRC, 2012); NSW 
Ombudsman, Policing Intoxicated and Disorderly Conduct: Review of Section 9 of the Summary 
Offences 1988 (NSW Ombudsman 2014); NSW Ombudsman, Review of the Impact of Criminal 
Infringement Notices on Aboriginal Communities (NSW Ombudsman, 2009). 
14 J Quilter, L McNamara, K Seear and R Room, ‘Intoxication’ and Australian Criminal Law: 
Implications for Addressing Alcohol and Other Drug-Related Harms and Risks. Report to the 
Criminology Research Advisory Council. Grant: CRG 20/14-15 (May 2018), p 56. See also E 
Methven, ‘“A Very Expensive Lesson”: Counting the Costs of Penalty Notices for Anti-social 
Behaviour’ (2014) 26(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 249-258; B Saunders et al, ‘The Impact 
of the Victorian Infringements System on Disadvantaged Groups: Findings from a Qualitative Study’ 
(2014) 49(1) Australian Journal of Social Issues 45-66; P Mazerolle et al, Ticketing for public nuisance 
offences in Queensland: An evaluation of the 12-month trial Griffith University, 2010). 
	 7 
The recommendation that a ‘simple public interest test for police’ be developed is also an innovation 
that warrants further investigation. In order for the test to achieve the objective of reducing 
criminalisation, it will need to be framed in such a way as to exclude from the reach of public order 
and other minor offences behaviours that are currently falling within it. A harm/proportionality/cost 
analysis (discussed above in relation to Recommendation 1), could be a useful touchstone for this 
exercise. For example, it is well known that offensive language/public nuisance on-the-spot fines and 
charges often arise when an individual swears at a police officer.15 A simple public interest test might 
provide that, by definition, such behaviour is insufficiently harmful to warrant an on-the-spot fine, 
arrest or charge, and that other options should be employed by police officers (eg do nothing, counsel, 
caution, issue move-on direction). 
 
 
Build a better decision-making architecture: Recommendations 17 and 18 
 
We applaud the recommendation to establish a justice reform office. Our research shows that far too 
much criminal law making happens without adequate evidence gathering, co-ordination, consultation, 
costing and estimation of likely effects, including unintended effects. When given the opportunity, aw 
reform commissions and other bodies regularly undertake high-quality research and produce sound 
recommendations. However, there is typically no appropriate decision making architecture to translate 
these recommendations into policy and law reform. 
 
The proposed justice reform office would need to take account of the diversity of processes by which 
criminal law statutes come into being. Most are not the result of a reference to a law reform 
commission. A significant proportion of change proposals are developed ‘in house’ within government 
departments, or are the product of what we have described as ‘single-stage executive decision making’ 
where Cabinet makes a quick decision to enact laws, typically in response to a tragic ‘trigger’ event.16  
Designing a best practice decision-making architecture must involve further examination of the sorts 
of attributes that a ‘lead up’ process should have – including genuine and inclusive consultation, 
transparency, careful evidence-gathering, robust analysis and due deliberation (not haste). 
 
Our research has shown that, in Australia, existing institutional arrangements, involving bodies that in 
theory might be regarded as part of a criminal law decision-making architecture, are generally 
ineffective. For example, pre-enactment parliamentary scrutiny committees (such as the Legislation 
Review Committee in NSW) have been shown to be ineffective in influencing the shape of the criminal 
law. The reasons are several, but they include the fact that such bodies become involved far too late in 
the policy and law-making process.17 Attempts to involve the judiciary in post-enactment scrutiny, in 
an effort to curb over-criminalisation, have rarely succeeded.18 
 
																																																						
15 Quilter and McNamara, above n 11; E Methven, ‘A Little Respect: Swearing, Police and Criminal 
Justice Discourse’ (2018) 7(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 58-74 
DOI: 10.5204/ijcjsd.v7i3.428. 
16 L McNamara, J Quilter, R Hogg, H Douglas, A Loughnan, D Brown and L Farmer, ‘Understanding 
processes of criminalisation: Insights from an Australian study of criminal law-making’ (2019) 
Criminology & Criminal Justice (forthcoming). 
17 L McNamara & J Quilter, ‘Institutional Influences on the Parameters of Criminalisation: 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Criminal Law Bills in New South Wales’ (2015) 27 Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 21-40. 
18 L McNamara and J Quilter, ‘High Court Constitutional Challenges to Criminal Law and Procedure 
in Australia’ (2018) 41(4) UNSWLJ 1047-1082. 
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We note that in 2018 the Law Council of Australia suggested that all proposed changes to criminal 
justice policy and law should be required to undergo a ‘justice impact test’ to ‘better account for the 
downstream impacts of new laws and policies on the justice system, particularly in assisting 
disadvantaged groups.’19 This proposal resonates with the Commission’s recommendation that 
Queensland should develop a better decision-making architecture for criminalisation decisions. Both 
of these suggestions also echo the emerging ‘justice reinvestment’ paradigm which promotes 
redeployment of some of the $16 billion a year that Australian federal, state and territory governments 
spend on police, courts and prisons, back into communities whose socio-economic, housing, 
education, health and other disadvantages contribute significantly to the problems for which the 
criminal justice system is too often the default ‘solution’.20  
 
 
We thank the Commission for the excellent work that has been undertaken on this important inquiry. 






Dr Julia Quilter   
Associate Professor  
School of Law      
University of Wollongong 





Dr Luke McNamara 
Professor & Co-Director, Centre for Crime, Law and Justice 
Faculty of Law 
University of New South Wales 
Email: luke.mcnamara@unsw.edu.au 
																																																						
19 Law Council of Australia, Justice Project. Final Report (August 2018), 46. 
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/justice-project/final-report. This recommendation is based on United 
Kingdom Ministry of Justice, Guidance: Justice impact test (2 November 2016) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/justice-impact-test. 
20 D Brown, C Cunneen, M Schwartz, J Stubbs and C Young, Justice Reinvestment: Winding Back 
Imprisonment (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). See also L McNamara and J Quilter, ‘Influencing the 
Shape of Criminal Law-Making in NSW: Insights from Recent Empirical Studies’ in J Debeljak and 
L Grenfell (ed), Law Making and Human Rights: Executive and Parliamentary Scrutiny across 
Australian Jurisdictions (Thomson Reuters, forthcoming 2019). 
 
